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Allocations, Adverse Selection and Cascades in IPOs 
Evidence from Israel 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines three theories of IPO underpricing, using data from Israel where the 
allocations to subscribers are equally prorated and publicly known.  Rock’s (1986) theory 
of adverse selection is supported: subscribers receive greater allocations in overpriced 
IPOs. And, while the average IPO excess return is 12%, the simulated allocation-
weighted return to uninformed investors is slightly negative.  Welch’s (1992) theory of 
information cascades is supported by the pattern of allocations: demand is either 
extremely high or there is undersubscription, with very few cases in between.  Also 
supported is the proposition that underpricing is a means to increase ownership 
dispersion. 
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1.  Introduction 
Stocks issued in IPOs appear to be underpriced: they earn an average positive 
return immediately following the IPO. This phenomenon has been documented in many 
countries.1  This paper tests three theories of underpricing in IPOs by using data from the 
Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) which make these tests feasible. In addition, a number 
of other explanations of underpricing, which are not feasible in Israel, are excluded. 
The high positive returns observed in IPOs cannot be earned in practice because 
of adverse selection. Rock (1986) proposed that uninformed investors are allocated 
greater quantities in overpriced IPOs and smaller quantities in underpriced IPOs. This is 
because investors who are informed about the issuing company’s value select to invest in 
underpriced IPOs.  Underpricing is then needed to attract uninformed investors. In 
equilibrium, "weighting the returns by the probabilities of obtaining an allocation should 
leave the uninformed investor earning the riskless rate" (Rock (1986), p. 205). 
Rock's (1986) theory cannot be directly tested in the U.S. where the allocation of 
shares to subscribers in IPOs is at the discretion of brokers and varies across subscribers.2  
It is therefore impossible to simulate the return that would be earned by uninformed 
investors, nor is it possible to examine whether allocations are related to underpricing.   
In Israel, however, the allocation of securities in IPOs is done by equal proration 
to all subscribers and the allocation rate was publicly announced. This enables us to 
directly test Rock’s (1986) theory, which we do in two ways.   
(i) We test for adverse selection by examining whether the allocation to subscribers 
was greater in overpriced IPOs. 
                                                 
1 See Loughran, Ritter and Rydkvist (1994), Ritter (1998), Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001). 
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(ii) We simulate the excess return earned by investors who would act as uninformed 
ones -- participate equally in each and every IPO (or subscribe randomly to some 
IPOs). 
We obtain that there is adverse selection in IPOs, consistent with Rock (1986). In 
addition, while the average IPO excess return is about 12%, the simulated excess return 
to uninformed investors is slightly negative albeit with marginal statistical significance.  
This may mean that IPOs may have been slightly overpriced. However, investors whom 
we call partially informed could slightly improve their performance and earn zero return, 
as proposed by Rock (1986).  These investors were uninformed about the issuing firm, 
but they could use publicly available information about the market and participate 
selectively in IPOs that were preceded by high market return or low volatility. 
The second theory that we examine is that of Welch's (1992) on information 
cascades or herding.  If investors learn about the value of the issued company by 
observing the behavior of other investors, issues will underprice their stock to create a 
cascade or herding of buyers. We finds that indeed investors either subscribed 
overwhelmingly to new issues or largely abstained, with very few cases in between, 
which is consistent with information cascades.  
Thirdly, we examine the theory that underpricing is a means to increase 
ownership dispersion after the IPO.  Booth and Chua (1996) proposed that greater 
ownership dispersion increases stock liquidity which in turn reduces the issuer’s cost of 
capital. Brennan and Franks (1997) proposed that greater ownership dispersion serves the 
interest of managers who do not want to be monitored by large shareholders, in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Michaely and Shaw (1994) find results that are consistent with Rock’s (1986) theory by relating IPO 
underpricing to the extent of subscription by informed investors which are considered informed. 
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case underpricing may be viewed as agency cost.  We find strong support for this theory: 
greater underpricing is associated with a larger number of accepted subscription in the 
IPO, controlling for the firm’s size. 
We find that underpricing is done deliberately: it is a function of some factors that 
are known before the IPO price is set.  These factors also affect the excess demand in the 
IPO.  The evidence on deliberate underpricing casts doubt on the view that the initial IPO 
returns, which measure underpricing, are a result of fads and irrational demand, as has 
often been suggested.  Our evidence shows that underpricing is greater when the IPO is 
preceded by a rise in market prices, meaning that issuers are not fully raising the issue 
price when market conditions are favorable. This evidence is consistent with the 
Loughran and Ritter’s (2001) proposition that issuers do not mind “leaving money on the 
table” when they raise in the IPO more than they have expected. 
Our setting enables us to exclude some theories on underpricing which are not 
accommodated by the institutional framework in Israel.  Ruud (1993) suggested that IPOs 
generate an average positive excess returns because underwriters are engaged in price 
stabilization, which is allowed by law.  The price stabilization reduces the incidence of 
negative IPO returns and thus the average IPO return is positive. However, in Israel the 
law does not allow price stabilization after the IPO.  This makes Ruud’s (1993) 
explanation of underpricing inapplicable in our setting. 
Another theory, by Tinic (1988), suggests that underpricing serves as a form of 
insurance for underwriters against legal liability and the associated damages. In Israel, 
however, there were no cases of law suits against underwriters. 
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Rock’s (1986) theory was studied in other countries where data was available on 
allocation to subscribers.  The results of these studies are not conclusive. The results were 
inconsistent among these studies: in two studies the return was decreasing in order size 
(in one, the relationship is non-monotonic) while in one it was increasing in size. In 
addition, there were some problems with the allocation procedure in IPOs in these 
countries that were absent in Israel. 
Koh and Walter (1989) studied 66 IPOs in Singapore during 1973-1987. There, 
allocation to subscribers was done by “combinations of full allocation, pro-rata allocation 
and balloting” (p. 268) with the selection of an allocation basis done by the issuer after 
the IPO.  The probability of allocation was a non-monotonic decreasing function of the 
order size.  They found that the IPO return, adjusted for allocation, was positive but 
insignificantly different from zero. It was higher for small orders and lower for larger 
ones, with the return-order size relationship being non-monotonic, having a saw-teeth 
pattern that reflected the allocation method.  Levis (1990) analyzed 123 IPOs during 
1985-1989 in the UK, where issuers had discretion as to the method of allocation as a 
function of the order size, involving ballot or rationing or both. Rationing “may involve 
any form or pattern that suits the particular circumstances” (p. 78). Then, “the probability 
that an investor obtains a specified number of shares, … is proportional but not always 
linear to the size of the application” (p. 78).  The average return, adjusted for allocation, 
was positive and statistically significant. The return was increasing in the order size and 
then decreasing for larger orders, being insignificant for the largest orders above 2 
million pounds.  (This was calculated using estimates on the probability of obtaining 
certain number of shares at a specific level of application.)  Keloharju (1993) studied 80 
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cases of IPOs in Finland during 1984-1989, where the allocation was a function of the 
order size with the formula of allocation being set ex post. He found that the allocation-
weighted excess return was a declining function of the order size, being positive for small 
orders and negative, up to about -5%, for large orders. 
In these studies, the uninformed investors’ returns were affected by their order 
placement strategy since the allocation was a function of the order size and its method 
(balloting or rationing or a combination of both) was sometimes determined ex post. This 
makes it difficult to simulate the strategy for uninformed investors. In addition, in 
Finland, investors could be effectively excluded from participating in IPOs that garnered 
high demand: the acceptance of new orders could be stopped at any time before the IPO 
day by the management of the issue, after learning that the issue has been fully 
subscribed. (Indeed, subscriptions to IPOs were often discontinued before the closing day 
of the offering.)  And, payment was done one or two months after the first day of issue, 
which raised the effective return due to the time value of money. Finally, the reliability of 
rationing data in Finland was varying. 
In contrast, in Israel allocation was simply proportional to the order size3 and 
every investor wishing to participate in the IPO could do so at any time during the IPO 
day.  This enables to simulate the returns earned by uninformed investors and test Rock's 
(1986) propositions on the return-allocation relationship. 
In what follows, section 2 describes the data and the main variables – excess 
return and allocation – and their determinants.  Section 3 presents two tests of Rock's 
(1986) theory: section 3.1 provides a test of the existence of adverse selection in IPOs, 
                                                 
3 Except in four cases during the period 11/1989-11/1993, 1.4% of the sample, in which allocations was a 
decreasing function of the quantity ordered by investors.  
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and section 3.2 provides evidence on the excess return earned by uninformed investors.  
Section 4 analyzes the performance of uninformed investors who can condition their 
participation on publicly-available information. The theory that relates underpricing to 
ownership dispersion is tested in Section 5, and Section 6 presents evidence on the 
participation of institutional investors in IPOs. Section 7 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Data, underpricing and allocation 
The study includes 284 IPOs in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange between 11/1989 
and 11/1993, after which time the IPO method has changed.4 Table 1 presents some 
information about the IPOs in our study. Most IPOs − 84.6% of them − were of units, a 
bundle of stocks and warrants or bonds (mostly convertible) or both, which were sold 
together but were separable right after the IPO. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
Two pricing methods were used in the IPOs: fixed price or auction with specified 
minimum and maximum prices.  Auction was by far the most common method, used in 
about 86% of the IPOs.  In auctions, investors submitted bids for some quantity, 
specifying a price within the announced range (including the upper and lower bounds).  
However, most auctioned IPOs were effectively like fixed-price IPOs with the price set at 
the maximum auction price: 77% of auctioned IPOs closed at the maximum price, which 
ended up being the IPO price, and the allocation was done by proration.  When 
equilibrium was attained at a price below the maximum, bidders at the maximum price 
were allocated the full quantity they ordered and paid the equilibrium auction price. 
                                                 
4 In 12/1993, it was mandated that all IPOs be auctioned with no maximum prices; see Kandel, Sarig and 
Wohl (1999).  
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The unit price was included in the prospectus which was published one week (five 
business days) before the IPO day.  In a case of an auction, maximum and minimum 
prices were announced.  Subscriptions were received by brokers on the IPO day, from 
morning till noon.  To guarantee the integrity of the orders,  an investor had to deposit 
with her broker the full amount of her subscription on the day of the IPO. 
Our simulation of an uninformed investor assumes bidding at the fixed issue price 
or, in case of an auction, bidding at the auction’s maximum price, which would guarantee 
this investor to be apportioned some units in each and every IPO. Bidding below the 
maximum price would have excluded this investor from about three quarters of auctioned 
IPOs that closed at the maximum price. 
 
2.1 Underpricing 
Trading in the stock commenced on the day after the IPO day, and trading in the 
other securities that were included in the unit usually commenced three days after the 
IPO.  Securities issued in IPOs traded by a once-a-day auction method that was used for 
small-cap securities, called Karam, and thus their prices were more noisy and adjusted 
more slowly to information than in a continuous trading market (see Amihud, Mendelson 
and Lauterbach (1997)).  We therefore measure the initial return on IPOs six days after 
the IPO (which are two or three days after the warrants and bonds in the unit started to 
trade).   Underpricing is measured by the initial six-day excess return on the IPO unit of 
securities of firm j,  
(1) ERj = Pj,6 /P0 j − Mj,6 /Mj,0 . 
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Pj,t is the unit price of firm j on day t, day 0 being the IPO day, and P0j is the unit’s issue 
price. The post-IPO unit price is the sum of the market prices of its components (of the 
securities that make up the unit).5  Mj,t is the closing price of the TASE Karam market 
index on day t relative to the IPO day of firm j.  This index is the proper benchmark for 
IPO securities since it included securities with small float, similar to the newly issued 
securities. To examine longer-term returns, we also calculate the return over 150 days6 
after the IPO: 
(2)   ER150j = Pj,150 /P0j − Mj,150 /Mj,0 . 
INSERT TABLE 2 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
Statistics on excess returns in IPOs are presented in Table 2 and the distribution of 
the initial excess return, ERj, is depicted in Figure 1.  The average ERj is 11.99%, highly 
significant (t = 7.20).  Two third of the returns (66.6%) are positive; this proportion is 
significantly different from a chance result of 50% (t = 5.58).  The average 150-day 
excess return, ER150j, is slightly higher, 15.00% (t = 4.16).  Notably, the mean excess 
return from day +6 to day +150 is insignificantly different from zero (mean = 2.95%, 
t=1.10), and the initial excess return ERj shows no evidence of overshooting that is 
subsequently reversed. The correlation between ERj and the subsequent excess return 
over days +6 to +150 is very small, –0.028, insignificantly different from zero. This 
evidence shows that the market seems to price the issued units efficiently immediately 
after the IPO, and that the IPO excess return is not a result of fad or overreaction. 
                                                 
5 For example, if the unit of firm j included one share of stock and two warrants, Pj,6 would be the share 
price plus twice the warrant price. 
6 The time period after the IPO was limited because of the later expiration of warrants and convertible 
bonds, which were included in most of the IPOs, and because of limitations on the availability of data.. 
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2.2. Allocation 
Testing Rock's (1986) theory requires having data on the rate of allocation to 
subscribers in IPOs.  In Israel, the allocation rate of the issued units was equal among all 
subscribers and was publicly disclosed at the end of the IPO day.  The allocation rate was 
simply the ratio of the number of units issued to the number of units ordered by investors, 
and equaled 1.0 when the issue was undersubscribed,7 in which case the underwriter 
absorbed the unsold quantity.  ALLOCj denotes the allocation rate in IPO j, 
0 < ALLOCj ≤ 1.     
INSERT TABLE 3 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
Statistics for ALLOCj are presented in Table 3, and the pattern of its distribution is 
shown in Figure 2.  The distribution of ALLOCj is an extreme U-shaped distribution that 
is skewed to the left.  While the mean ALLOCj is 0.360, the median is far lower, 0.048.  
The allocation in most IPOs was extremely small due to overwhelming oversubscription, 
and in many cases there was undersubscription at the IPO price or at the auction 
maximum price, resulting in ALLOCj = 1.0.   
The distribution of ALLOCj is consistent with the implications of Welch's (1992) 
model of information cascades.  There, each investor has a prior belief about the true 
value of the IPO, which is revised after having observed the IPO price and whether other 
investors subscribe or abstain.  Based on that, the investor then decides on whether to 
subscribe to the IPO.   Since one investor's decision is influenced by that of others, there 
is herding into subscribing or abstaining.  As a result there is either overwhelming 
                                                 
7 In the four IPOs where allocation was declining in order size, ALLOCj is the ratio of issued units to the 
quantity subscribed.  Excluding these four observations does not change the results in any meaningful way. 
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oversubscription or undersubscription.  Figure 2 indeed shows evidence of very high 
demand or abstention, with only a few issues in between these extremes. 
The U-shaped distribution of the allocation could also be obtained if underwriters 
simply erred in setting the IPO price compared to what investors considered the right 
price.  An error in either direction of the correct price would cause demand by investors 
to bunch at either ends of the allocation segment, i.e., either at 1 (in overpricing) or close 
to zero (in underpricing). 
 
2.3. The determinants of underpricing and allocation 
IPOs seem to have been deliberately underpriced.  This is evident from the fact 
that both underpricing and allocation are affected by publicly available information 
known prior to the IPO.  The following are the variables that are likely to affect the IPO 
excess return and the demand for IPO units. 
(i)   The market’s past returns.  If underwriters fully adjust the IPO price to market 
conditions, the market return before the IPO price is set should be unrelated to 
underpricing.  The pricing decision of the IPO was made when the prospectus was 
submitted, five or six days before the issue day.  Issuers could withdraw the prospectus 
and cancel the IPO, but it was very rarely done.  We consider the ten-day market return 
before the IPO price was set, days –16 to –6,  
(3) RM6-16j  = Mj,-6/Mj,-16 − 1, 
where Mj,t is the TASE Karam market index.  We also consider the five-day market 
return between the price setting day and the IPO day, days –6 to –1 (day –1 is the last full 
day with information about the market before investors entered their orders on day 0), 
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(4) RM1-6j  = Mj,-1/Mj,-6 − 1. 
We expect that RM1-6j should affect ERj since this market return occurred after the IPO 
price had been set. However, RM6-16j is not expected to affect ERj if this information 
about the market were fully incorporated in the pricing of the IPO 
(ii) LSIZEj is the logarithm of the issue size, in monetary units (Israeli Shekels, in 
constant prices of December 1992).  If we liken the IPO to a block sale, then it is 
expected that larger IPOs are underpriced more in order to entice sufficient demand.8 
(iii)   AUCTIONj = 1 for IPOs sold by the auction method with upper and lower price 
limits, and 0 for IPOs sold at a fixed price.   Because the auction had an upper price limit, 
it effectively became a fixed price method when that limit was binding and then rationing 
was necessary.  This occurred in 77.1% of the auctions (see Table 1).  Yet, in auctions an 
equilibrium price could be reached below the maximum price without a need for the 
underwriter to absorb the unsold quantity.  Therefore, underwriters could set higher 
maximum prices than they would in fixed-price IPOs since their risk of undersubscription 
was lower.9  As a result, inderpricing is expected to be smaller in IPOs by auction.  While 
evidence shows that IPO underpricing was smaller in countries where auctions are used 
(Loughran, Ritter and Rydkvist (1994)), this is the first study that compares the effects on 
underpricing of the two methods of IPOs within the same market. 
(iv)   SDERj measures the uncertainty about the IPO price. It is the standard deviation 
of daily excess return over ten days (+6 to +15) after the IPO.  Theory predicts a positive 
relationship between underpricing and uncertainty. Rock (1986, p. 189) stated: “the 
                                                 
8 Kraus and Stoll (1972) showed that large block sales were associated with a temporary liquidity discount. 
9 We found no systematic factors affecting the selection of the method of issue by firms and underwriters. 
In a Probit model of the determinants of the choice of the auction method, observable variables such as 
LSIZEj, SDERj and RM6-16j did not have any significant effect. 
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greater the uncertainty about the true price of the new shares, the greater the advantage of 
the informed investors and the deeper the discount the firm must offer to entice 
uninformed investors into the market.”   Welch (1992) proposed that underpricing is an 
increasing function of a mean-preserving increase in the spread of investors’ prior beliefs 
about the IPO price.  In addition, risk-averse underwriters with firm commitment to 
absorb the quantity that is unsold at the IPO price may underprice the issue to reduce 
their risk.  Indeed, empirical evidence shows that underpricing rises with price 
uncertainty (Ritter (1984)). 
(v)  UNITj = 1 in an IPO where a unit of securities is issued, and UNITj = 0 in an IPO 
of stock alone.  In our sample, unit IPOs included stock and warrants or bonds (mostly 
convertible) or both and constituted about 85% of the cases.  The decision to issue a unit 
of securities rather than stock alone is usually affected by corporate finance and incentive 
issues, but it may also be affected by marketing considerations.  In response to our 
inquiry, underwriters said that it was “easier” to sell units that included warrants and 
convertibles.  
The effects of these variables are examined in regression models where the IPO 
excess return, ERj, and the allocation rate are functions of the pre-IPO returns RM1-6j and 
RM6-16j, the issue size LSIZEj, the method of sale AUCTIONj, the uncertainty SDERj and 
the composition of the unit UNITj.  In the allocation model we use ALLOCTj , the logistic 
transformation of the allocation rate: 
(5)   ALLOCT=log(ALLOC+a)/(1+ALLOC+a),  
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where a= ½/284, to accommodate the cases where ALLOC=1 or is practically zero.10  The 
estimation results of these models are presented in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The results show that the factors that led to greater underpricing also stimulated 
higher demand and brought about smaller allocation: the signs of the coefficients in one 
model are the opposite of their signs in the other model.  This means that underpricing 
was greater than necessary to ensure a given level of (excess) demand. An exception is 
the type of unit, UNITj, whose effect is insignificant in the allocation equation (it is  
therefore not included in the final estimation of the allocation model). 
The coefficients of RM1-6j are significant in both models, as expected.  Given that 
the IPO price was stale by the time the IPO took place, a rise in the market price would 
make the issue underpriced, and this would also create excess demand and smaller 
allocation.  However, the significant coefficients of RM6-16j imply that underwriters 
deliberately did not sufficiently adjust IPO prices after having observed changes in 
market prices.  The mean of RM6-16j is 2.27% (t = 10.82), and the coefficient of RM6-16j 
being 2.343 (see Table 4) means that the average effect of prior market return on 
underpricing was 5.32%, a sizable part of the entire underpricing. This shows that a great 
deal of deliberate underpricing was associated with a pre-IPO rise in market prices. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Table 5 shows that underwriters timed the IPOs to take place after an unusual rise 
in market prices.  The daily return during days (-26, -16) was about twice as high as the 
daily return after the IPO price was announced in the prospectus, days (-6, -1), and during 
the ten days after the IPO.  Underpricing was not affected significantly by the market 
                                                 
10 See Cox (1970), p. 33. 
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price rise in days (-26, -16), apparently because this was incorporated into the IPO price. 
But underpricing was positively affected by the still higher-than-usual market price rise 
during days (-16, -6), just before the IPO price has been determined, implying that this 
information was not fully incorporated into the IPO price. 
This evidence is consistent with Loughran and Ritter’s (2001) explanation of 
underpricing that result from incomplete adjustment of the IPO price to pre-IPO 
information about demand, which is revealed in the book-building process.  The evidence 
is that underpricing is greater when underwriters raise the IPO price relative to the pre-
announced IPO price range, implying that they do not fully adjust the price to 
information. Hanley (1993) suggested that underwriters want to elicit truthful information 
from investors during the book building process, hence they do not fully adjust the IPO 
price to information that is revealed then. Based on prospect theory, Loughran and Ritter 
(2001) proposed that issuers do not mind “leaving money on the table” if the IPO brings 
them higher value than they have expected.  In Israel, the pre-IPO process was not similar 
to that in the U.S. and therefore Hanley’s (1993) explanation may not apply. But doing an 
IPO following a rise in market prices enables issuers to raise their issue price and raise 
more money.  If issuers just wanted to underprice IPOs irrespective of market conditions, 
they would fully adjust the IPO price to the rise in market prices and then reduce it by a 
constant; but then there would be no relationship between underpricing and the pre-IPO 
market return.  The existence of such a relationship is consistent with Loughran and 
Ritter’s (2001) proposition. 
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Larger IPOs were more underpriced, perhaps to enable traders absorb the larger 
quantity of securities.  However, the underpricing of IPOs was greater than was necessary 
to attract a sufficient level of demand: excess demand of these IPOs was higher. 
The use of auction led to smaller underpricing, which explains the popularity of 
this method (see Table 1).  Indeed, the auction method (without setting an upper price 
limit) was mandated by the Israeli Securities Authority in December 1993.  As expected, 
this reduced underpricing (Kandel et al (1999)).  The smaller underpricing also reduced 
the excess demand in auction IPOs. 
Greater uncertainty about the issued securities led to greater underpricing as well 
as greater excess demand, which resulted in smaller allocation. That is, the greater 
underpricing of riskier IPOs did not necessarily provide greater risk premiums to their 
buyers.  The result here is consistent with the suggestion that riskier IPOs are priced 
lower to protect the interests of risk-averse underwriters. 
Finally, underpricing was smaller for IPOs of units that included, in addition to 
stock, warrants or bonds or both.11  This is consistent with the underwriters' claim that 
unit IPOs are “easier” to sell. 
Underpricing measured by ERj does not necessarily imply gains to uninformed 
investors since, as suggested by Rock (1986), greater excess returns are offset by smaller 
allocations. This is examined in the next section. 
 
                                                 
11 Underpricing was not significantly affected by whether the additional securities in the unit were warrants 
or bonds or both.  
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3. Two tests of Rock's theory 
3.1. Test I of Rock's theory: adverse selection 
Rock's (1986) hypothesis of adverse selection (or winner's curse) in IPOs implies 
a negative correlation between IPO returns and allocations to investors.  Because 
informed investors avoid overpriced IPOs, uninformed investors then receive larger 
allocations and earn negative returns. In underpriced IPOs that earn high returns, 
uninformed investors receive smaller allocation. 
Consistent with Rock's (1986) proposition of adverse selection in IPOs, we obtain 
the following relation: 
(6) ERj =   0.093 − 0.028 ALLOCTj 
(t statistic)12 (6.62)   (9.07)   R2 = 0.225 
Lest the results are unduly affected by the extreme cases where ALLOCj > 0.95, we 
exclude these observations (they constituted 25.7% of all IPOs).  Estimating the model 
for 211 IPOs where ALLOCj < 0.95, we obtain: 
(6’) ERj =   0.033 − 0.044 ALLOCTj 
(t statistic) (1.56)   (6.74)   R2 = 0.136 
The results thus strongly support the existence of adverse selection in IPOs.13 
Another examination of the adverse selection proposition is presented in Table 3, 
where the sample divided between overvalued and undervalued IPOs. In overvalued IPOs 
(where ERj < 0) the average allocation rate is 0.613 whereas it is 0.232, less than half, in 
undervalued IPOs (where ERj > 0).  The difference between medians is much greater.  In 
overvalued IPOs, the median allocation is 0.920 whereas it is very small, 0.013, for 
undervalued IPOs. This strongly supports the proposition of adverse selection in IPOs. 
                                                 
12 The t statistics are calculated using White’s (1980) robust standard errors. 
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The negative return-allocation relationship can also be obtained under a simpler 
scenario. Assume that all investors are equally informed in the sense that each observes 
the true value of the issued company with some error, and underwriters err in setting the 
IPO price equal to this value.   If the support of the distribution of investors’ beliefs is 
narrow, it is likely that the underwriter will set the price outside of this support. Then, 
when the IPO price is smaller than the true value there is excess demand and low 
allocation, or if the opposite occurs there is undersubscription and full allocation to those 
who subscribe.  When trading commences, the market price adjusts to the true value, and 
this gives rise to a negative relationship between the IPO return and the allocation rate. 
 
3.2. Test II of Rock's proposition: allocation-weighted excess returns 
Rock (1986) proposed that in equilibrium, the excess return should be zero to 
uninformed investors in IPOs who are subject to adverse selection.  To test this 
proposition, we assume that uninformed investors subscribe a fixed amount for each and 
every IPO (or subscribe randomly to some IPOs).   Their allocation-weighted excess 
return is given by 
(7) ERAWj = ALLOCj⋅ERj – interest . 
ERj is the excess IPO return over days 0 to +6 (defined in (1)), ALLOCj is the allocation 
received in the IPO by equal proration to all subscribers, and interestj is the one-day 
interest rate14 that prevailed at the time of the IPO of company j.  This is because 
investors subscribing to an IPO had to deposit for one day the entire amount of their 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Koh and Walter (1989), Levis (1990) and Brennan and Franks (1997) found a positive relationship 
between oversubscription and underpricing. 
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order, to ensure that they did not default on the commitment to buy the number of units 
ordered at the specified price. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
The statistics for ERAWj are presented in Table 2 and depicted in Figure 3.  The 
mean ERAWj is negative, −1.18%, with t = 1.77, marginally significant.15  The median of 
ERAWj is practically zero.  The distribution of ERAWj is negatively skewed, affected by 
the “lemons” where investors were allocated the full amount of their order and the return 
was negative.   As a further check of the allocation-weighted excess return, we calculate 
it over 15 days, from day 0 to +15.  Its mean is more negative, −1.77% with t = 2.41, 
quite significant.  The long-term allocation-weighted excess return for 150 days after the 
IPO, ERAW150j, has a mean of −2.43% with t = 1.52. 
The conclusion is that the allocation-weighted excess return at the IPO is negative 
with marginal statistical significance.  This means that uninformed investors lose on 
average, which is inconsistent with Rock’s (1986) prediction.  This suggests that from the 
viewpoint of uninformed investors, IPOs are slightly overpriced.  Perhaps IPOs attract a 
selective type of investors that are overoptimistic about their prospects, or are risk loving.  
Because it was impossible to short the IPO stock, the views of informed investors could 
not play a role in determining the market price right after the IPO.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 We use the interest rate for withdrawals from bank accounts (source: Bank of Israel report, various 
issues).  The practice was that banks, which are by far the largest brokers in Israel, provided the funds for 
the one-day deposit. In the sample, the average one-day interest rate was 0.00054. 
15 An alternative formulation of the allocation-weighted excess return is ERAWjM = ALLOCj⋅ERj – Mj,0 /Mj-1 
which means that instead of borrowing the money for one day (shorting a bond), investors borrowed stock 
(shorted the market) for one day. The results are similar: the mean of ERAWjM is −1.17% with t = 1.75. 
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4. Conditioning IPO subscription 
Investors that were uninformed about the issuing firms were assumed here to 
subscribe to all IPOs or subscribe randomly to some of them. In doing so, these investors 
realized a small loss, which is inconsistent with Rock's (1986) prediction.  The question 
is whether these uninformed investors could improve their performance by conditioning 
their subscription on information other than the value of the issuing firm.  The following 
shows examples of these investors' performance. 
 
4.1. Conditioning on past market returns and volatility 
Investors could use publicly available information about the market conditions 
prior to the IPO that includes market return and market volatility.  We examine the effect 
of this information as follows. Over the fifteen-day period before the IPO we measure 
(i) RM1-16j, the market return (using the Karam index), days -16 to -1, and  
(ii) SDRMj, the standard deviation of the market return, days -16 to -1. 
We then estimate the effects of these variables is on the allocation-weighted excess return 
by the following models: 
(8.1) ERAWj   =  −0.0248   +  0.432 ⋅RM1-16j  
(t statistic)    (2.87)       (3.33)                     R2 = 0.031,  
and 
(8.2) ERAWj   =    0.0291   − 4.024⋅SDRMj  
(t statistic)    (1.61)       (2.34)                     R2 = 0.025. 
The results suggest that investors in IPOs could increase their allocation-weighted 
return by subscribing only to IPOs that were preceded by favorable market conditions: 
high market return or low market volatility.  This is also seen in the following test. In 
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IPOs that were preceded by RM1-16 above its median, investors broke even: mean 
ERAWj = 0.0086 (t = 1.11).  However, in IPOs with RM1-16 below its median, investors 
lost: mean ERAWj = −0.0320 (t = 3.04).  The difference between the two means is 
significant (t = 3.10).  It follows that there is a significant loss from investing in IPOs 
after the market has under performed. 
 Market uncertainty, measured by SDRMj, had negative effect on investors’ 
earnings, but this effect was weaker.  When both measures of market performance, 
RM1-16j and SDRMj, are included in the same model, market return emerges as the one 
with the stronger effect (the correlation between the two measures is –0.45). 
Conditioning subscription to IPOs on other variables did not affect investors' 
performance.  We added to model (8) the variables LSIZEj, AUCTIONj and SDERj that 
are included in the underpricing model.  While these variables affect the excess return 
ERj, they also affect ALLOCj in the opposite direction, and on balance they have no 
significant effect on the allocation-weighted excess return ERAWj.  The absence of a 
significant effect of SDERj on ERAWj means that investing in riskier IPOs did not yield a 
higher risk premium, as might be expected for risk averse investors. 
The results thus suggest that Rock's (1986) equilibrium, in which uninformed 
investors earn zero excess return, applied to partially uninformed investors. These 
investors, while being uninformed about the issuing firm, could use publicly available 
information about the market condition before the IPO to avoid under-performing IPOs.  
The use of such information could erase the small loss that they would have incurred if 
they subscribed to all IPOs (or to some of them at random). 
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4.2. Conditioning on allocation 
 Subscriptions to IPOs had to be entered on the IPO day from morning till noon.  
While no information was available during the day on the accumulated orders, many 
investors could obtain coarse information about it by talking to other investors and to 
their brokers who observed the order flow at their post.  If investors could choose to 
participate in IPOs conditional on the flow of orders entered by other investors, the 
scenario would resemble the one described by Welch (1992), which causes information 
"cascades." 
Was the information about the extent of the pre-IPO demand valuable?  The 
evidence is that Corr(ERAWj , ALLOCTj) = −0.215, statistically significant.  However, 
this relationship is driven by 63 cases (22% of the sample) of undersubscribed IPOs 
(ALLOCj = 1); excluding these IPOs, we obtain Corr(ERAWj , ALLOCTj) = 0.005. While 
for the undersubscribed IPOs the mean ERAWj is –0.0663 (t = 2.40), for the rest the mean 
ERAWj is 0.0037 (t = 1.34).  Thus, investors that were uninformed about the issuing firm 
could break even by avoiding IPOs with low investor interest if they had this information; 
the exact extent of demand beyond that was not valuable.  In fact, this is expected in an 
efficient market where rational investors enter orders, based on their information, up to 
the point where the information cannot be profitably exploited.  Still, the puzzle is why 
informed investors subscribed early and disclosed their information about the IPO, when 
they did not benefit from that while inducing more demand that diluted their gain. 
Since demand begets additional demand, the question is what prevents an 
unstoppable cascade of demand.  Welch's (1992) model limits investors' purchase to no 
more than one share.  In Israel, the cascade was bounded by the requirement that 
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investors deposit the entire order amount for one day, which entails an interest cost, 
interestj (see (7)).  This cost would offset the gain in IPOs with very small allocation 
(high demand) and thus discourage subscribing to them.  We estimate the relationship 
between investor gain and allocation for half the sample (142 IPOs) for which 
ALLOCj < 0.0478 (the median): 
(9) ERAWj    =  0.0065    + 0.0012⋅ ALLOCTj  
(t statistic) (4.24)  (4.09)   R2 = 0.174 
The results show that the higher was the demand and the smaller the allocation, the 
smaller was the gain.  This is also depicted in Figure 4, which plots the relationship 
between the allocation and the allocation-weighted excess return ERAWj for IPOs with 
allocations below the median.  And given that the gain in the case of small allocation was 
practically nil, considering the fixed cost of time and effort involved in subscribing to an 
IPO means that investors who knew the extent of demand would be better off avoiding 
the very hot IPOs altogether. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
5. Underpricing as a means to increase ownership dispersion 
Underpricing in IPOs leads to rationing and then, if the allocation scheme is 
discretionary, the issuer may increase the dispersion of stock ownership by favoring 
small subscribers.  There are two explanations for the issuer’s preference for broader 
ownership base of the firm’s stock. Booth and Chua (1996) proposed that larger investor 
base increases the liquidity of the stock in the secondary market after the IPO, which in 
turn lowers the firm’s cost of capital and increases its value (Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), Amihud, Mendelson and Uno (1999)).  Then, underpricing is viewed as the price 
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paid by the issuer to achieve greater value for the stock in the market, and is thus 
beneficial to the firm.  On the other hand, Brennan and Franks (1997) proposed that 
diffused ownership serves the interests of managers who are averse to being monitored 
by large shareholders.16  By this hypothesis, underpricing buys private benefits for 
managers.  Since the cost is borne in the IPO by the firm’s owners, it will be undertaken 
only when the cost to the decision makers is smaller than the benefit to them.  
We test the hypothesis that IPO underpricing is positively associated with 
ownership dispersion immediately after the IPO.  Unlike in the UK, issuers in Israel have 
no discretion in allocating shares to subscribers, and therefore underpricing can increase 
ownership dispersion if it entices more investors to participate in the IPO.  Importantly, 
since the allocation was proportional rather than a decreasing function of the order size 
(as it was in the UK, Singapore, Finland), investors had no motive to split their orders 
into smaller pieces. Thus, it can be assumed that each order represents a different 
investor, and then the number of orders accepted provides a measure of the ownership 
dispersion. 
Denote by ORDERSj the number of orders accepted at the IPO.  In fixed-price 
IPOs, these are all the orders submitted (or, all subscriptions) because the issued quantity 
was divided among all subscribers.  In auctioned IPOs, the accepted orders are those that 
offered to buy the units at a price that was higher than or equal to the price at which the 
auction closed.  Data on accepted orders were available for 273 cases (96.1% of the 
sample).  We use the transformation of the order size, LORDERSj = log(ORDERSj). 
                                                 
16 See also Bolton and von Thadden (1998). Brennan and Franks (1997) found that greater underpricing is 
associated with allocation which is more discriminating against larger subscribers, thus promoting greater 
ownership dispersion by smaller shareholders. 
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The following model tests how ORDERSj, which serves as a measure of 
ownership dispersion after the IPO, was affected by underpricing, measured by the excess 
return ERj, controlling for other characteristics of the IPOs. 
(10) LORDERSj = −3.650       +   1.595⋅ERj   +  0.623⋅LSIZEj  +  6.661⋅RM1-16j    
 (t statistic) (1.34)  (6.26)       (3.84)           (4.29)    
          +  10.818⋅SDERj    
(2.00)    R2 = 0.348 
The hypothesis is strongly supported. The highly significant coefficient of the IPO 
excess return ERj means that greater underpricing is positively associated with the 
number of accepted orders and thus generates larger investor base and greater dispersion 
of ownership after the IPO.  We already know from (6) that underpricing is associated 
with greater demand relative to the issue size, which results in smaller allocation. Greater 
demand can be generated by each investor increasing his or her order size, without 
having more investors coming in.  The result here suggests that that underpricing 
attracted more investors.  This is consistent with the proposition that underpricing is a 
means to increase ownership dispersion.  But the evidence is also consistent with Rock’s 
(1986) theory: informed investors avoid are more likely to participate in underpriced 
IPOs and overpriced ones. 
 Larger IPOs led to a larger number of accepted orders, and they were each larger 
in size (in monetary value).  This follows from the coefficient of LSIZEj being 
significantly smaller than one, meaning that the number of orders grew less than 
proportionately with the issue size.  Investors were willing to submit larger orders in 
larger IPOs probably because such IPOs have more liquid after market, which mitigates 
the liquidity cost of selling their holdings later.  
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The results also show that more investors were drawn to participate in IPOs 
following a rise in market prices.  Finally, risky IPOs draw more investors. (Other 
variables did not have significant effect.) 
 In conclusion, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing in 
IPOs is associated with greater ownership dispersion. 
 
6. Institutional investors: are they more informed? 
Institutional investors may be considered more informed and sophisticated, thus 
are more likely to participate in IPOs that are underpriced, as suggested by Rock (1986). 
We test this hypothesis here.    
We know of the participation of institutional investors only when it was indicated 
in the prospectus that they commitment to buy a certain number of units at the IPO price. 
This price was either the price that was fixed for the IPO, or in the case of an auction it 
was the equilibrium price that was achieved then. The institutional investors benefited 
from receiving the entire quantity that they had ordered (up to a limit set by the Securities 
Authority) regardless of the allocation rate at the IPO.  In 48 cases (17% of the sample) 
the prospectus indicated such participation by the institutional investors. 
If institutional investors are informed, they should be more likely to participate in 
underpriced IPOs where ERj is greater.  Also, they may participate more in 
oversubscribed IPOs that may have attracted informed investors. We examine this 
hypothesis in the following probit model, where INSTDUMj = 1 when the participation of 
institutional investors was indicated in the prospectus (zero otherwise): 
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(11)   INSTDUMj =  −15.271  − 0.141⋅ERj  − 0.014⋅ALLOCTj   +  0.880⋅LSIZEj  
 (t statistic)    (7.64)       (0.32)    (0.54)  (7.45)   
− 0.464⋅AUCTIONj      
   (1.78)   R2 = 0.276 
 
The results show that the institutional investors’ participation was unrelated to 
underpricing or to investors’ demand for the IPO.  The coefficients of both ERj and 
ALLOCTj are insignificantly different from zero.  If institutional investors are assumed to 
be better informed than other investors, these results are inconsistent with Rock’s (1986) 
explanation of the cause for underpricing.  But it is possible that institutional investors 
were not better informed, and that their commitment to participate in IPOs was not 
motivated by better information.17  
Being large investors, institutional investors chose to participate in larger IPOs.  
Large IPOs have better after-market liquidity that accommodates large investors who 
may need to sell their holdings.  Or perhaps underwriters who were concerned about their 
ability to sell large IPOs solicited the participation of institutional investors.  Finally, 
auctioned IPOs attracted smaller participation by institutional investors, perhaps because 
the disclosure of their participation in the prospectus would entice greater demand by 
others, and this would raise the IPO price and reduce their gain. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines three theories of underpricing in IPOs.   First, we test Rock's 
(1986) theory of adverse selection by which uninformed investors receive large 
allocations of securities in overpriced IPOs and small allocations in underpriced IPOs.  In 
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equilibrium, they earn zero excess return.  Second, we examine Welch’s (1992) theory of 
information cascades by which investors set their own demand after having observed the 
demand of others, which leads to herding -- demand is either very high or is very low.  
Then, underpricing is a means to create a cascade of high demand.  Third, we test the 
proposition that underpricing is a means to increase ownership dispersion for reasons of 
liquidity (Booth and Chua (1996)) or less monitoring of management (Bolton and von 
Thadden (1998)). The study employs Israeli data on the allocation rate to IPO subscribers 
and on the number of orders accepted.  In particular, the allocation to IPO subscribers is 
done by equal proration. This enables to simulate the return earned by uninformed 
investors. 
We find evidence of adverse selection: there is a negative relationship between 
underpricing and the rate of allocation to subscribers.  And, the mean excess return to 
uninformed investors is slightly negative, −1.18%, although its statistical significance is 
marginal.   This seems inconsistent with Rock's (1986) prediction. However, we show 
that investors who were uninformed about the issuing firm’s value could improve their 
performance and break even by subscribing to IPOs that were preceded by good market 
performance, measured by high return or low volatility.  This means that there may be 
partially informed investors – those that are uninformed about the firm but informed 
about the market – for whom the results are consistent with Rock’s (1986) prediction. 
The distribution of allocations to IPO subscribers exhibits an extreme U-shaped 
pattern, indicating herding among investors: they either subscribe overwhelmingly to new 
issues or largely abstain and then there is undersubscription. This pattern is consistent 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Because the major underwriters and the main institutional investors in Israel are banks, it may be that the 
participation of these investors was motivated by other reasons. See Ber et al (2001). 
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with Welch's (1992) model of information cascades in IPOs.   We show that if investors 
who were uninformed about the firm’s value had information about the extent of demand, 
they could improve their performance by avoiding undersubscribed IPOs and joining 
those with high demand. 
We also obtain results that are consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is 
a means to increase ownership dispersion (Booth and Chua (1996), Brennan and Franks 
(1997)). We find that the number of orders accepted at the IPO -- and consequently the 
number of new shareholders -- is increasing in the IPO return, which measures 
underpricing. 
Our estimations show evidence of deliberate underpricing: both the initial IPO 
return and the allocation (which measures excess demand) were affected by factors 
known before the IPO price has been set. These factors include the pre-IPO market 
return, size of IPO, the use of auction method, the type of unit of securities that was 
issued, and the uncertainty about the IPO.  These results are somewhat puzzling. If 
underpricing was done to elicit demand by any of the theories examined, it did not have 
to be related to these factors. Instead, underwriters could price the issue properly, and 
then reduce the price by an amount that is unrelated to these factors. Our results lend 
support to Loughran and Ritter’s (2001) explanation of underpricing that results from 
incomplete adjustment of  IPO prices to information available to issuers.  They proposed 
that issuers do not mind “leaving money on the table” when they raise more money than 
they have expected. We obtain that IPOs are more likely to take place after favorable 
market conditions, indicated by a relatively high rise in market prices, and since the IPO 
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price is not fully adjusted to this information, underpricing when it is preceded by a rise 
in market prices.  
Finally, we examine the participation of institutional investors by way of 
precommitting to buy a certain quantity at the IPO price. These investors may be 
considered informed and thus are expected to participate more in underpriced IPOs.  
However, we find that their participation is unrelated to underpricing or to the extent of 
demand -- their preference was to participate in large IPOs. While this evidence is not 
consistent with Rock’s (1986) theory on underpricing, it may simply suggest that the 
participation of institutional investors was not motivated by better information.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of the IPOs in this study 
 
Period: 11/1989-11/1993. Number of IPOs: 284. 
 
Composition of unit issued Method of IPO pricing 
Auction 
Year of 
issue 
Total 
num. Stock 
only 
Stock + 
warrant 
Stock + 
warrant 
+ bonds
Stock  
+ bonds 
Fixed 
price Total Closed 
at max* 
11/1989 
    -1990 
10 0 5 4 1 1 9 6
1991 16 3 11 1 1 2 14 10
1992 87 13 57 13 4 11 76 57
1993 171 28 104 34 5 25 146 116
Total 284 44 177 52 11 39 245 189
Propor- 
      tion 
1.00 0.155 0.623 0.183 0.039 0.137 0.863 0.771+ 
 
* "Closed at max" means that the demand at the auction's maximum price exceeded the 
issued quantity and rationing was necessary. (In auctions, underwriters specified 
maximum and minimum prices.) 
 
+ The proportion out of the 245 IPOs sold by the auction method. 
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Table 2: Excess returns in IPOs, with adjustment for allocation 
 
The excess return is ERj = Pj,6 /Pj,0 − Mj,6 /Mj,0 .  Pj,t is the price on the IPO unit of firm j 
on day t, where day 0 is the IPO day and Mj,t is the TASE Karam market index on day t 
pertaining to the IPO of firm j. day 0 is the IPO day.  
ER150j = Pj,150 /Pj,0 - Mj,150 /Mj,0 is the 150 day excess return on the IPO unit. 
The allocation-weighted excess return is ERAWj = ALLOCj ⋅ERj − interestj , where 
ALLOCj is the allocation to subscribers in the IPO of firm j, calculated as the ratio of 
issued units to the total demand, 0 < ALLOC ≤ 1, and interestj is the one-day interest cost. 
ERAW150j is the allocation-weighted excess return over 150 days after the IPO. 
  
Period: 11/1989-11/1993. Number of IPOs: 284. 
 
 Variable Mean Median Skewness Minimum Maximum 
1 ER 0.1199 
(7.20) 
0.0660 1.264 -0.6581 1.7671 
2 ER150 0.1500 
(4.16) 
0.0563 1.728 -0.9450 3.7424 
3 ERAW -0.0118 
(1.77) 
0.0001
 
-0.736 -0.6587 0.5731 
4 ERAW150 -0.0243 
(1.52) 
-0.0002 0.706 -0.9457  1.1848 
(t statistics, testing that the mean is different from zero.) 
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Table 3: Allocation in IPOs 
ALLOCj is the allocation to subscribers in the IPO of firm j, calculated as the ratio of 
issued units to the total demand, 0 < ALLOC ≤ 1. 
The excess return is ERj = Pj,6 /Pj,0 - Mj,6 /Mj,0 .  Pj,t is the price on the IPO unit of firm j 
on day t, where day 0 is the IPO day and Mj,t is the TASE Karam market index on day t 
pertaining to the IPO of firm j. day 0 is the IPO day. 
 
Period: 11/1989-11/1993. Number of IPOs: 284. 
 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Obs. 
ALLOC 0.3595 0.0478 0.0003 1.0000 284 
For ERj < 0: 
ALLOCj 
 
0.6134 0.9200 0.0015 1.000
 
95 
For ERj > 0: 
ALLOCj 
 
0.2319 0.0127 0.0003 1.000
 
189 
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Table 4: The determinants of IPO allocations and excess returns 
 
ERj =  α0 + α1 RM1-6j + α2 RM6-16j + α3 LSIZEj +α4 AUCTIONj  
+ α5 SDERj + α6 UNITj + νj 
ALLOCTj = β0 +β1 RM1-6j +β2 RM6-16j +β3 LSIZEj +β4 AUCTIONj  
+β5SDERj + uj . 
 
ERj = the excess return on the IPO unit of firm j over days (0, +6). 
ALLOCTj = log((ALLOCj +a)/(1+ALLOCj+a)) is the transformed ALLOCj, the 
proportional allocation rate to subscribers, 1 < ALLOCj ≤ 1, and a= ½/284.  
RM1-6j = market return from day -6 to day -1.  
RM6-16j = market return from day -16 to day -6.  
LSIZEj = logarithm of size of issue (in December 1992 prices).  
AUCTIONj =1 for IPOs sold at the auction method (with an upper and lower bounds) and 
0 for IPOs sold at a fixed price.  
SDERj = standard deviation of daily excess returns, days (+6,+15).  
UNITj = 1 in IPO of units that include other securities in addition to stock. 
 
Period: 11/1989-11/1993. Number of IPOs: 284. 
 
Dependent variable  
ERj ALLOCTj 
Constant -0.563 
(1.89) 
15.343
(2.02)
RM1-6j 1.388 
(2.82) 
-26.502
(3.04)
RM6-16j 2.343 
(5.53) 
-33.251
(4.40)
LSIZEj 0.043 
(2.39) 
-0.893
(2.00)
AUCTIONj -0.128 
(2.20) 
1.348
(2.02)
SDERj 4.500 
(3.31) 
-68.215
(3.90)
UNITj -0.120 
(2.27) 
R2 0.213 0.150
(t statistic in parentheses; standard errors use  
White’s (1980) robust estimation.) 
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Table 5: Market return around the IPO day 
 
Daily return on the market Karam index before and after day 0, the IPO day. 
 
 Days -26 to -16 Days -16 to -6 Days -6 to -1 Days 0 to +10 
Market return (%) 0.326 0.225 0.144 0.138 
 
 1 
 
Figure 1:  The distribution of excess return in IPOs 
The excess return is ERj = Pj,6 /Pj,0 - Mj,6 /Mj,0 .  Pj,t is the price on the IPO unit of firm j on day t, where day 0 is the IPO day and Mj,t is 
the TASE Karam market index on day t pertaining to the IPO of firm j. 
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Figure 2:  The distribution of allocations to investors in IPOs 
ALLOCj is the allocation of units of firm j to subscribers, calculated as the ratio of issued units to the total demand for units at the IPO. 
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Figure 3:  The distribution of allocation-weighted excess return in IPOs 
The allocation-weighted excess return is ERAWj = ALLOCj ⋅ERj − interestj , where ERj = Rj – RMj, the excess return on the IPO unit 
over days (0, +6), ALLOCj is the proportional allocation to shareholders who participated in the IPO of firm j and interestj is he one-
day interest cost. 
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Figure 4:  The allocation-weighted excess return against Allocation 
The allocation-weighted excess return is ERAWj = ALLOCj ⋅ERj − interestj , where ERj = Rj – RMj, the excess return on the IPO unit 
over days (0, +6), ALLOCj is the proportional allocation to shareholders who participated in the IPO of firm j and interestj is he one-
day interest cost.  ALLOCTj =(ALLOCj+a)/(1-ALLOCj+a), where a= ½/284. The data presented here is for half the sample (142 IPOs) 
for which ALLOCj below its median. 
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